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Since 2007, the world has been suffering 
from one of the biggest financial crises in 
modern history. Astonishingly large amounts 
of public money were required to keep the 
financial sector afloat. Since the outbreak of 
the crisis, the eurozone countries alone have 
had to provide more than € 1.1 trillion in 
public support to the financial sector (or 12% 
of the eurozone’s GDP). As Europe is still 
dealing with troubles in its financial sector, 
the costs are likely to increase even further.1 
Given the devastating effects of the financial 
crisis, regulators worldwide have been taking 
far-reaching steps to prevent similar crises 
from reoccurring. In the EU, policymakers 
face an even more pronounced reform 
challenge, due to the weaknesses of its 
monetary union. The crisis painfully 
highlighted the great interdependency of 
eurozone countries and their banking sectors. 
Because of the “vicious link” that exists 
between the two during crises, European 
leaders agreed to put in place a Banking 
Union for the eurozone and other, 
voluntarily participating, Member States. The 
Banking Union’s key goal is to lift the control 
of the banking sector to the European level 
and –as a result– to undo the tenacious link 
between banks and sovereigns. Completing 
the Banking Union is a vast endeavour that 
will take several years.2 
The reforms are likely to facilitate a better 
response to a future financial crisis. However, 
will the measures be sufficient for when a 
large-scale crisis hits? After providing an 
overview of the firewalls that are to deal with 
financial upheavals, this Policy Brief argues 
This Policy Brief argues that the 
envisaged design of the Banking 
Union risks not being sufficient to 
deal with the next large-scale 
financial crisis. Therefore, an “if all 
else fails” clause should be 
approved, stating that the Banking 
Union members can provide joint 
last resort financing to deal with a 
future crisis. An agreement on the 
clause should be feasible because it 
is beneficial to all Member States. 
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that the Banking Union might indeed not be 
sufficiently equipped to deal with big crises. 
It therefore calls for a last resort instrument 
in the form of an “if all else fails” clause. 
THE FIREWALLS TO PREVENT CRISES 
AND BAILOUTS – AND THEIR LIMITS 
If completed, the post-crisis reform measures 
are to result in five successive firewalls in the 
Banking Union to prevent and/or limit 
financial crises. The figure below provides an 
overview of each of these firewalls.  
 
Figure 1: Banking Union firewalls to prevent and deal 
with crises 
1) Regulation and supervision 
The first financial crisis firewall aims to make 
the occurrence of financial crises less likely. 
This is to be achieved by reforms in financial 
sector regulation and supervision that 
attempt to fill in the numerous gaps that have 
been laid bare by the financial crisis. In terms 
of supervision, three European Supervisory 
Authorities have been created to improve 
coordination across Member States. The 
European Systemic Risk Board, in turn, is to 
monitor overall risks in the financial sector. 
For the countries that will participate in the 
Banking Union, supervisory reforms are to 
go a lot further than better coordination. In 
the second half of 2014, these countries will 
see the responsibility for bank supervision 
lifted to the European Central Bank through 
the creation of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). 
While these reforms address a number of 
manifest problems in the financial sector, it is 
not realistic to expect that better regulation 
and supervision will prevent all future crises. 
As regulators and supervisors have 
difficulties keeping up with new 
developments in the financial sector, the 
regulatory framework tends to become 
gradually less effective. Even with periodic 
readjustments, it is not feasible to prevent 
financial bubbles and the resulting crises 
from occurring altogether.3 Or, as John 
Kenneth Galbraith summed it up: 
“[r]egulation outlawing financial incredulity 
or mass euphoria is not a practical 
possibility.”4 
2) Crisis management 
To deal with these future financial upheavals, 
common crisis management rules are being 
developed in the EU. The Council and the 
Parliament are discussing a Directive on 
Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRRD in the 
EU jargon), with the aim of approving the 
text by the end of 2013.5 Early intervention 
will be a main element of these new rules, in 
order to address difficulties as soon as they 
arise. 
In addition to the common rules, the 
Commission has proposed lifting crisis 
management to the European level for the 
countries that belong to the Banking Union. 
This would involve a Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) that is to become 
operational in 2015.6 Under the 
Commission’s proposal, decision-making in 
the SRM would be centralised at the 
1 
• Financial regulation (ongoing) and 
European level supervision (end 2014) 
2 
•European level crisis management 
(2015) 
3 
•Bail-in (light now, more substantial in 
2018) 
4 
•Resolution Fund (start in 2015, 
complete in 2025 at best) 
5 
•ESM direct recapitalisation (end 2014) 
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European level – which makes sense as 
supervision would be centralised as well. 
European level crisis management will allow 
for a more coherent, and hence less costly, 
cross-border approach to financial turmoil. 
Nonetheless, larger crises would still require 
substantial financial resources. This is 
illustrated by the United States’ response to 
the financial crisis: despite the centralised 
supervision and crisis management, the US 
still had to spend approximately € 395 bn 
($ 520 bn) to save its financial sector.7 
3) Bail-in tools 
The financial resources for crisis 
management would, in the first instance, be 
claimed from a troubled bank itself through a 
“bail-in”. This implies that the costs of the 
restructuring or resolution of a bank are paid 
for by the bank’s shareholders and 
bondholders (and, ultimately, deposits above 
€ 100,000) as far as possible. Full-scale bail-in 
rules are expected to enter into force in 2018. 
In the meantime, revised state aid rules have 
been put in place in August 2013. These are 
already a partial move in the direction of bail-
ins. If successfully applied, bail-ins will 
represent a fundamental shift in the modern 
approach to crises in the financial sector, 
which has relied heavily on public bail-outs.8  
The bail-in tools will likely allow covering 
part of the costs attached to a large financial 
crisis. However, they might not always be 
sufficient. Moreover, in case of major crises 
the bail-in tools will probably not be used to 
their full extent. If investors in one bank see 
the value of their shares and claims evaporate 
during a crisis due to a bail-in, investors in 
other banks will likely be willing to sell their 
shares and claims at huge losses before they 
risk losing even more. This can easily 
aggravate panic in the financial markets, 
running against a core goal of crisis 
management. 
4) Resolution Fund 
If the bail-in tools, in turn, prove insufficient 
or too risky to be applied, the EU foresees a 
Resolution Fund to step in. Under the 
Commission’s SRM proposal, the Resolution 
Fund is to cover all countries participating in 
the Banking Union. The Fund is to be built 
up over a period of 10 years by contributions 
from the financial sector itself.9 The Fund 
will hence only be fully funded by 2025 at 
best. These ex-ante resources of the 
Resolution Fund are to be equal to 1% of the 
deposits protected by deposit insurance, 
which amounts to approximately € 55 bn. 
Such limited resources could be quickly 
exhausted if a large-scale crisis occurs. 
If the ex-ante resources indeed prove 
insufficient, the Fund could compel the 
financial system to provide ad-hoc funding to 
finance the resolution of a troubled bank. If 
such funding would not be available in time, 
the Fund would be able to borrow the 
necessary resources on the financial market, 
or from other parties. Yet, during significant 
crises, it might not be realistic to expect the 
Fund to be able to collect or borrow large 
sums of money from the private sector. The 
financial system risks being too fragile for 
such operations. 
In that case, the Commission hopes that the 
Resolution Fund can turn to the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Yet, nowhere in 
the legislative proposal is this mentioned 
explicitly.10 The lack of clear rules on whether 
the Resolution Fund can borrow from the 
ESM might hamper a swift response to a 
large-scale financial misadventure. 
Furthermore, it is quite possible that the 
ESM would have already responded to the 
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crisis by lending substantial amounts to 
Member States or directly to banks (see 
infra), leaving it short of resources to lend to 
the Resolution Fund. 
5) ESM direct recapitalisation 
If the firewalls above have proven 
unsuccessful in financing the costs associated 
with a financial crisis, the Banking Union is 
to rely on the final instrument that is 
foreseen by the EU, i.e. direct recapitalisation 
by the ESM. This is a rather traditional bail-
out instrument that is lifted to the European 
level. Member States foresee a total of 
€ 60 bn at most for this purpose. 
The relatively small amount constitutes the 
weak element of this supposedly ultimate 
firewall. In light of the huge costs linked to a 
big crisis, the funding could possibly be 
depleted rather swiftly. In addition, only 
eurozone countries participate in the ESM. It 
should not be taken for granted that they will 
provide money to recapitalise a bank that 
operates in a non-eurozone member of the 
Banking Union. 
THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR PUBLIC 
RESOURCES AND THE UNCERTAINTIES 
ATTACHED  
The implementation of the firewalls 
discussed above is likely to provide the 
necessary resources to deal with moderate 
financial turmoil. Yet, it is doubtful whether 
the instruments will be sufficient when a 
large-scale financial crisis hits. As mentioned, 
the financial crisis that started in 2007 has 
required more than € 1 trillion of public 
money in the eurozone alone. Even if the 
costs of a large-scale financial crisis would be 
cut in half by improved regulation, 
supervision and crisis management, a 
tremendous amount of money would still be 
needed. There is hence a genuine possibility 
that the instruments that have been foreseen 
by the Commission will not be able to 
generate sufficient resources in time.  
If the foreseen instruments prove insufficient 
indeed, the Banking Union would have the 
choice between either letting one or more 
banks fail in an uncontrolled manner, or 
resorting to public resources. The latter will 
at times be the least bad option; in the midst 
of a crisis, there may be little or no alternative 
but to resort to the taxpayer.11 
This assessment gives rise to the question of 
how a public bailout would take place in the 
Banking Union. It is most probable that the 
Member State in which a troubled bank is 
located will pass the blame for the bank’s 
failure on to the rules and supervision at the 
European level. Indeed, due to the 
responsibility for supervision at this 
European level, the countries in the Banking 
Union become jointly responsible for when 
such supervision fails. This joint 
responsibility for common policy failures 
leads to the belief that all the Member States 
that participate in the Banking Union would 
have to provide jointly the last resort 
financial means to deal with a crisis if needed. 
Yet, despite the fact that collective public 
bailouts are a distinct possibility, there is no 
clarity whatsoever on how such bailouts 
would take place in the Banking Union. How 
would the common decision be made? 
Would (some) national parliaments have to 
approve it? Which formula would be used to 
divide the financial resources put up by each 
Member State? These questions all remain 
unanswered. 
A degree of uncertainty about whether and 
how public resources would be used during a 
financial crisis is in itself not a bad thing. It 
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helps to counter the moral hazard that arises 
if bankers are confident that they will be 
bailed out in case their risky investments turn 
sour. In their seminal book Manias, Panics, and 
Crashes, Charles Kindleberger and Rober 
Aliber put it as follows: “[s]ome ambiguity as 
to location of ultimate responsibility may be 
helpful to the extent that it leaves some 
uncertainty so that bankers are more self-
reliant—provided there is not so much uncertainty as 
to disorient the market.”12 
The last part of this quote is of paramount 
importance for the Banking Union. As 
Kindleberger and Aliber add, ambiguity may 
be preferred in a “close-knit society.” Yet, a 
different situation arises when there is a lack 
of coherence among the decision-makers. 
The authors refer to the consequences of the 
1907 financial crisis in Italy, where “[p]art of 
the difficulty may have lain in the lack of 
sufficient cohesion among Turin, Genoa, 
Milan, and Rome and the resulting 
uncertainty, buck-passing and indecision.”13 
Given the reluctance in the EU to foresee 
cross-border transfers, the Banking Union at 
present hardly seems the close-knit society 
envisaged by Kindleberger and Aliber. 
Therefore, if the cited cities are replaced by 
Berlin, Madrid, Paris and Rome, the response 
of Italian cities to the 1907 crisis could read 
as a prediction of the Banking Union’s 
response to the next big crisis. 
THE “IF ALL ELSE FAILS” CLAUSE 
Precisely because solidarity in the Banking 
Union is not self-evident, a basic level of 
clarity should be provided on the way last 
resort public resources would be deployed 
during a financial crisis. The Commission’s 
proposals leave excessive uncertainty, which 
could prove most costly during the next 
crisis. 
This weakness is a reason to agree on an “if 
all else fails” clause. This clause would 
provide the basic outline of the Banking 
Union’s last resort public backstop, without 
providing too much detail either. The key to 
success is affirming that public financial 
assistance is conceivable as a last resort, while 
letting bankers understand that it will most 
likely not take place. 
From this point of view, the “if all else fails” 
clause should state two things. First of all, it 
should explicitly acknowledge that the ESM 
is able lend to the Resolution Fund under 
extraordinary circumstances. Implicit 
speculation is simply not enough. In addition, 
the clause should mention that, if all else fails, 
the Member States of the Banking Union can 
decide to lend on an ad-hoc basis to the 
Resolution Fund. The clause ought to 
indicate which basis would be used for the 
calculation of national contributions (e.g. the 
ESM capital key calculations) and how the 
decision would be made (qualified majority 
voting or based on ESM decision-making 
rules). 
It is possible that this “if all else fails” clause 
cannot be included in the future SRM 
Regulation due to the fact that the Treaty 
basis of that Regulation does not extend to 
fiscal matters (Art. 114(2) TFEU). If this 
would indeed be the case, the clause can be 
adopted on the basis of unanimity under 
Article 192(2) TFEU. Alternatively, an 
intergovernmental agreement outside of the 
EU Treaties framework can be signed 
(possibly annexed to the ESM Treaty). If the 
EU Treaties would be revised in the future, 
Member States would then be able to include 
the “if all else fails” clause into the acquis 
communautaire. 
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HOW TO MAKE THE CLAUSE 
ACCEPTABLE TO EVERY MEMBER 
STATE 
It might at first sight seem difficult to get all 
Member States to agree to an “if all else fails” 
clause. Creditor countries –Germany is a case 
in point– are wary of having to pay for the 
policy mistakes of others. However, if 
properly designed, this would not hold true 
for the “if all else fails” clause. 
Crucially, the clause should relate only to 
problems that occur after the ECB takes over 
bank supervision. Problems that arise earlier 
evidently have to be addressed as well.14 Yet, 
as ill-fated national policies play a substantial 
role in the present difficulties, it is 
understandable that creditor countries expect 
individual national governments to pay the 
bulk of the costs associated with these 
problems. Potentially, an additional transition 
period could be foreseen during the first 
year(s) of the ECB’s supervisory operations, 
as problems that arise early on can still be 
partly due to previous ill-fated national policy 
choices. 
After that point, the Banking Union 
members will inevitably face a new reality. 
Financial difficulties that will arise from that 
moment onwards can no longer be attributed 
to national policy mistakes. They will have 
become a common responsibility. The 
consequences of bank failures will then have 
to be dealt with jointly, i.e. financed jointly if 
ultimately required. 
The “if all else fails” clause would allow the 
Banking Union to deal with future problems 
in a credible manner, without unjustly 
dragging individual countries into the vicious 
link between banks and sovereigns. As the 
clause deals only with future problems, it 
should be seen as an insurance mechanism, 
not a hidden transfer device. Every Member 
State would benefit from the balanced 
burden-sharing rules, and the improved 
financial stability it entails. 
CONCLUSION 
The EU has come a long way since the 
financial crisis hit the banking sector and the 
economy at large. The reform process that 
has been initiated needs to be continued. 
Depending on the completion of this process 
–notably the European Banking Union 
project– the probability of new financial 
crises ought to be reduced. Yet, crises will 
still occur. While the successive firewalls that 
are envisaged can be sufficient for a range of 
financial difficulties, there is a genuine risk 
that they will not be enough when the next 
big financial crisis hits the Banking Union. 
This risk needs to be addressed in order to 
prevent the indecisiveness and uncertainty 
that can prove so very costly during crises. 
To this extent, an “if all else fails” clause, 
enabling the Banking Union to deal with a 
large-scale crisis, should be introduced at the 
European level. The clause should provide 
for two things: (i) an explicit acknowledge-
ment that the ESM can lend to the 
Resolution Fund and (ii) a statement that the 
Banking Union Member States can decide to 
provide last resort financing in case all other 
instruments have proven insufficient. This “if 
all else fails” clause would be proof of the 
Banking Union’s resolve and capability to 
deal effectively with financial crises. 
Preparation for a next crisis should indeed 
start now. 
Stijn Verhelst is Senior Research Fellow at 
Egmont – Royal Institute for International 
Relations. 
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